Journal of Chaohu University ›› 2018, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (6): 20-26.
Previous Articles Next Articles
Abstract: Based on the theory of dynamic game, this paper analyzes the evolutionary game relationship between regulators and people忆s livelihood financial institutions. Through the evolutionary game theory, the key factors affecting the stability of the game model and the equilibrium stability strategy of the two main bodies are obtained. The research shows that rent-seeking variables play a key role in the evolution of game behavior and the formation of equilibrium and stability strategy. Strengthening supervision is not necessarily the most efficient way to solve people忆s livelihood financial problems. Appropriate punishment intensity can effectively adjust the evolution of game behavior. Through further analysis, this paper puts forward some suggestions,so as to provide reference for promoting the innovation, coordination, orderly and efficient development of the national people’s livelihood finance and supervision mode.
