The participation of property service enterprises in community home-based elderly care is an important measure for China to actively respond to the aging population. Considering the synergistic effect of property service enterprises and elderly care institutions, and introducing the value of negative feedback from elderly users, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of property service enterprises, elderly care institutions, and the community to analyze the evolutionary stability of the strategic choices of different actors. The results show that: the value of negative feedback from elderly users can effectively inhibit the generation of collusive behaviors, promote the active collaborative service of property service enterprises and elderly care institutions, and reduce community supervision costs; increasing government subsidies and penalties will increase the willingness of property service enterprises and elderly care institutions to participate and reduce their willingness to collude; increasing the revenue of elderly care services and reducing costs are also important ways to improve collaborative elderly care services. These results will provide reference for alleviating the government爷s financial pressure from elderly care, adding value and empowering property service enterprises and elderly care institutions, and improving the quality of elderly care services.