物业服务企业参与社区居家养老是我国积极应对人口老龄化的重要举措。考虑物业服务企业和养老机构的协同作用，引入老年用户负面反馈价值，构建物业服务企业、养老机构和社区三方演化博弈模型，分析不同行为主体策略选择的演化稳定性。结果表明：老年用户的负面反馈价值能很好抑制合谋行为的产生，促进物业服务企业和养老机构积极协同服务，降低社区监管成本；政府增加补贴力度与惩罚力度会提高物业服务企业和养老机构参与意愿，降低合谋意愿；提高养老服务收益、降低投入成本也是提高养老协同服务的重要途径。这些结果将为有效缓减政府养老财政压力、增值赋能物业服务企业和养老机构以及提高老年用户养老服务质量提供一定的决策参考。

The participation of property service enterprises in community home-based elderly care is an important measure for China to actively respond to the aging population. Considering the synergistic effect of property service enterprises and elderly care institutions, and introducing the value of negative feedback from elderly users, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of property service enterprises, elderly care institutions, and the community to analyze the evolutionary stability of the strategic choices of different actors. The results show that: the value of negative feedback from elderly users can effectively inhibit the generation of collusive behaviors, promote the active collaborative service of property service enterprises and elderly care institutions, and reduce community supervision costs; increasing government subsidies and penalties will increase the willingness of property service enterprises and elderly care institutions to participate and reduce their willingness to collude; increasing the revenue of elderly care services and reducing costs are also important ways to improve collaborative elderly care services. These results will provide reference for alleviating the government爷s financial pressure from elderly care, adding value and empowering property service enterprises and elderly care institutions, and improving the quality of elderly care services.