巢湖学院学报 ›› 2018, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (6): 20-26.
摘要：基于动态博弈理论，分析了监管机构与民生金融机构之间的演化博弈关系，并通过演化博弈理论得出影响博弈模型稳定性的关键因素，以及两主体的均衡稳定策略。研究表明，寻租变量对博弈行为的演化和均衡稳定策略的形成起着关键作用；强化监管不一定是解决民生金融问题最高效的途径；适当的惩罚力度能够有效调节博弈行为的演化。通过进一步分析提出建议，以期为推动国家民生金融和监管模式的创新、协调、有序、高效发展提供借鉴。#br#
Abstract: Based on the theory of dynamic game, this paper analyzes the evolutionary game relationship between regulators and people忆s livelihood financial institutions. Through the evolutionary game theory, the key factors affecting the stability of the game model and the equilibrium stability strategy of the two main bodies are obtained. The research shows that rent-seeking variables play a key role in the evolution of game behavior and the formation of equilibrium and stability strategy. Strengthening supervision is not necessarily the most efficient way to solve people忆s livelihood financial problems. Appropriate punishment intensity can effectively adjust the evolution of game behavior. Through further analysis, this paper puts forward some suggestions,so as to provide reference for promoting the innovation, coordination, orderly and efficient development of the national people’s livelihood finance and supervision mode.
